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Abstract This paper summarizes key findings of our research on peer review, which
challenge the separation between cognitive and non-cognitive aspects of evaluation.
Here we highlight some of the key findings from this research and discuss its rele-
vance for understanding academic evaluation in the humanities. We summarize the
role of informal rules, the impact of evaluation settings on rules, definitions of orig-
inality, and comparisons between the humanities, the social sciences and history.
Taken together, the findings summarized here suggest a research agenda for devel-
oping a better empirical understanding of the specific characteristics of peer review
evaluation in the humanities as compared to other disciplinary clusters.
1 Introduction
In How Professors Think (2009), Michèle Lamont draws on in-depth analyses of five
fellowship competitions in the United States to analyse the intersubjective under-
standings academic experts create and maintain in making collective judgments on
research quality. She analyses the social conditions that lead panelists to an under-
standing of their choices as fair and legitimate, and to a belief that they are able to
identify the best and less good proposals. The book contests the common notion that
one can separate cognitive from non-cognitive aspects of evaluation and describes
the evaluative process as deeply interactional, emotional and cognitive, and as mobi-
lizing the self-concept of evaluators as much as their expertise. Studies of the inter-
nal functioning of peer review reveal various ‘intrinsic biases’ in peer review like
M. Lamont (B)
Department of Sociology, Harvard University, 510 William James Hall,
33 Kirkland Street, Cambridge, MA 02138, USA
e-mail: mlamont@wjh.harvard.edu
J. Guetzkow
Department of Sociology and Anthropology, Hebrew University of Jerusalem,
Mount Scopus, 91905 Jerusalem, Israel
e-mail: joshg@mscc.huji.ac.il
© The Author(s) 2016
M. Ochsner et al. (eds.), Research Assessment in the Humanities,
DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-29016-4_4
31
32 M. Lamont and J. Guetzkow
‘cognitive particularism’ (Travis and Collins 1991), ‘favouritism for the familiar’
(Porter and Rossini 1985), or ‘peer bias’ (Chubin and Hackett 1990; Fuller 2002).
These effects show that peer review is not a socially disembedded, quality-
assessing process in which a set of objective criteria is applied consistently by various
reviewers. In fact, the particular cognitive and professional lenses through which eval-
uators understand proposals necessarily shape evaluation. It is in this context that
the informal rules peer reviewers follow become important, as are the lenses through
which they understand proposals and the emotions they invest in particular topics
and research styles. Thus, instead of contrasting ‘biased’ and ‘unbiased’ evaluation,
the book aims to capture how evaluation unfolds, as it is carried out and understood
by emotional, cognitive and social beings who necessarily interact with the world
through specific frames, narratives and conventions, but who nevertheless develop
expert views concerning what defines legitimate and illegitimate assessments, as well
as excellent and less stellar research.
How Professors Think concerns evaluation in multidisciplinary panels in the social
sciences and the humanities. It examines evaluation in a number of disciplines and
compares the distinctive ‘evaluative cultures’ of fields such as history, philosophy
and literary studies with those of anthropology, political science and economics.
This paper first describes some of the findings from this study. Second, summarizing
Lamont and Huutoniemi (2011), it compares the findings of How Professors Think
with a parallel study that considers peer review at the Finish Academy of Science.
These panels are set up somewhat differently from those considered by Lamont—for
instance focusing on the sciences instead of the social sciences and the humanities, or
being unidisciplinary rather than multidisciplinary. Thus we discuss how the structure
of panels affects their functioning across fields. Finally, drawing on Guetzkow et al.
(2004), we revisit aspects of the specificity of evaluation in the humanities, and more
specifically, the assessment of originality in these fields. Thus, this paper contributes
to a better understanding of the distinctive challenges raised by peer review in the
humanities.
2 The Role of Informal Rules
Lamont interviews academic professionals serving on peer review panels that eval-
uate fellowship or grant proposals. During the interviews, panelists are asked to
describe the arguments they made about a range of proposals, to contrast their argu-
ments with those of other panelists, and to explain what happened in each case.
Throughout the interviews, she asks panelists to put themselves in the role of privi-
leged informer and to explain to us how ‘it’ works. They are encouraged to take on
the role of the native describing to the observer the rules of the universe in which they
operate. She also has access to the preliminary evaluations produced before panel
deliberations by individual panelists and to the list of awards given.
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Since How Professors Think came out, it has been debated within various
academic communities, as it takes on several aspects of the evaluation in multi-
disciplinary panels in the social sciences and humanities. It is based on an analysis
of twelve funding panels organized by important national funding competitions in
the U.S.: those of the Social Science Research Council, the American Council for
Learned Societies, the Woodrow Wilson Fellowship Foundation, a Society of Fel-
lows at an Ivy League university and an important social science foundation in the
social sciences. It draws on 81 interviews with panelists and program officers, as
well as on observation of three panels.
A first substantive chapter describes how panels are organized. A second one
concerns the evaluative culture of various disciplines, ranging from philosophy to
literary studies, history, political science and economics. A third chapter considers
how multidisciplinary panels reach consensus despite variations in disciplinary eval-
uative cultures. This is followed by two chapters that focus on criteria of evaluation.
One analyses the formal criteria of evaluation provided by the funding organization
to panelists (originality, significance, feasibility, etc.) as well as informal criteria
(elegance, display of cultural capital, fit between theory and data, etc.). The follow-
ing chapter considers how cognitive criteria are meshed with extra-cognitive ones
(having to do with diversity and interdisciplinarity), finding that institutional and
disciplinary diversity loom much larger than gender and racial diversity in decision
making. A concluding chapter considers the implications of the study of evaluation
cultures across national contexts, including in Europe.
The book is concerned not only with disciplinary compromise, but also with the
pragmatic rules that panelists say they abide by, which lead them to believe that the
process is fair (this belief is shared by the vast majority of academics interviewed).
How Professors Think details a range of rules, which include for instance the notion
that one should defer to expertise, and that methodological pluralism should be
respected.
3 The Impact of Evaluation Settings on Rules
In an article with Katri Huutoniemi, Lamont explores whether these customary rules
apply across contexts, and how they vary with how panels are set up. Their paper,
‘Comparing Customary Rules of Fairness’, (Lamont and Huutoniemi 2011) is based
on a dialogue between How Professors Think and a parallel study conducted by
Huutoniemi of the four panels organized by the Academy of Finland. These panels
concern: Social Sciences; Environment and Society; Environmental Sciences; and
Environmental Ecology. This analysis is explicitly concerned with the effects of the
mix of panelist expertise on how customary rules are enacted. The idea is to com-
pare panels with varying degrees of specialization (unidisciplinary vs. multidiscipli-
nary panels) and with different kinds of expertise (specialist experts vs. generalists).
However, in the course of comparing results from the two studies, other points of
comparison beyond expert composition emerge—whether panelists ‘rate’ or ‘rank’
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proposals, have an advisory or decisional role, come from the social sciences and
humanities fields or from more scientific fields, etc. The exploratory analysis points
to some important similarities and differences in the internal dynamics of evaluative
practices that have gone unnoticed to date and that shed light on how evaluative
settings enable and constrain various types of evaluative conventions.
Among the most salient customary rules of evaluation, deferring to expertise
and respecting disciplinary sovereignty manifest themselves differently based on the
degree of specialization of panels: there is less deference in unidisciplinary panels
where the expertise of panelists more often overlap. Overlapping expertise makes
it more difficult for any one panelist to convince others of the value of a proposal
when opinions differ; unlike in multidisciplinary panels, insisting on sovereignty
would conflict with scientific authority. There is also less respect for disciplinary
sovereignty in panels composed of generalists rather than experts specialized in
particular disciplines and in panels concerned with topics such as Environment and
Society that are of interest to wider audiences. In such panels, there is more explicit
reference to general arguments and to the role of intuition in grounding decision-
making.
While there is a rule against the conspicuous display of alliances across all panels,
strategic voting and so-called ‘horse-trading’ appear to be less frequent in panels that
‘rate’ as opposed to ‘rank’ proposals and in those that have an advisory as opposed
to a decisional role. The evaluative technique imposed by the funding agency thus
influences the behaviour of panelists. Moreover, the customary rules of methodolog-
ical pluralism and cognitive contextualism (Mallard et al. 2009) are more salient in
the humanities and social science panels than they are in the pure and applied science
panels, where disciplinary identities may be unified around the notion of scientific
consensus, including the definition of shared indicators of quality. Finally, a concern
for the use of consistent criteria and the bracketing of idiosyncratic taste is more
salient in the sciences than in the social sciences and humanities, due in part to the
fact that in the latter disciplines evaluators may be more aware of the role played
by (inter)subjectivity in the evaluation process. While the analogy of democratic
deliberation appears to describe well the work of the social sciences and humanities
panels, the science panels may be best described as functioning as a court of justice,
where panel members present a case to a jury.
The customary rules of fairness are part of ‘epistemic cultures’ (Knorr-Cetina
1999) and essential to the process of collective attribution of significance. In this
context, considering reasons offered for disagreement, how those are negotiated, as
well as how panelists interpret agreement is crucial to capture fairness as a collective
accomplishment. Together, these studies demonstrate the necessity for more compar-
ative studies of evaluative processes and evaluative culture. This remains a largely
unexplored but promising aspect of the field of higher education, especially in a
context where European research organizations and universities aim to standardize
evaluative practices.
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4 Defining Originality
We now turn to a closer examination of forms of originality scholars from different
disciplines tend to favour, with a focus on contrasting the social sciences and the
humanities. As described in Guetzkow et al. (2004), we construct a semi-inductive
typology of originality. We use this typology to classify panelists’ statements about
the originality of scholarship, whether it is in reference to a proposal, the panelists’
own work, their students’ work, or that of someone whose work they admire. The
typology is anchored in five broad categories. These categories concern which aspect
of the work respondents describe as being original. They include the research topic,
the theory used, the method employed, the data on which it is based and the results
of the research (i.e. what was ‘discovered’). It also includes two categories that
have not been noted in previous research: ‘original approach’ (explained below) and
‘under-studied area’ (proposals set in a neglected time period or geographical region).
As shown in Table 1, there are seven mutually exclusive categories of originality
regarding the approach, under-studied area, topic, theory, method, data, and results.
Each of these generic categories consists of more specific types of originality,
which are included in Table 1. Whereas ‘Generic Types’ refer to which aspects of
the proposal are original, ‘Specific Types’ describe the way in which that aspect is
original. Where applicable, the first specific type we list under each generic category
refers to the most literal meaning that panelists attribute to this generic category,
followed by other specific types in order of frequency. For instance, the first specific
type for the generic category ‘original approach’ is ‘new approach’ and the other
specific types are more particular, such as asking a ‘new question’, offering a ‘new
perspective’, taking ‘a new approach to tired or trendy topics’, using ‘an approach that
makes new connections’, making a ‘new argument’, or using an ‘innovative approach
for the discipline’. Table 1 also describes the distribution of the 217 mentions of
originality we identify across the seven generic categories and their specific types.
Table 1 shows that the panelists we interviewed most frequently describe origi-
nality in terms of ‘original approach’. This generic category covers nearly one third
of all the mentions of originality made by the panelists commenting on proposals
or on academic excellence more generally. Other generic categories panelists often
use are ‘original topic’ (15 %), ‘original method’ (12 %) and ‘original data’ (13 %).
Originality that involves an ‘under-studied area’ is mentioned only 6 % of the time.
5 What Is an Original Approach?
Previous research on the topic of peer review has not uncovered the category we
refer to as ‘original approach’, and yet it appears that panelists place the greatest
importance on this form of originality. But what is it, and how does it differ from
original theory or method? ‘Original approach’ is used to code the panelists’ com-
ments on the novelty of the ‘approach’ or the ‘perspective’ adopted by a proposal,
or on the innovativeness of the questions or arguments it formulates. In contrast to
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original theory or method, an ‘original approach’ refers to originality at a greater
level of generality: the comments of panelists concern the project’s meta-theoretical
positioning, or else the broader direction of the analysis rather than the specifics of
method or research design. Thus in speaking of a project that takes a new approach
in her discipline, an art historian applauds the originality of a study that is going to
‘deal with [ancient Arabic] writing as a tool of social historical cultural analysis’. She
is concerned with the innovativeness of the overall project, rather than with specific
theories or methodological details. Whereas discussions of theories and methods start
from a problem or issue or concept that has already been constructed, discussions of
new approaches pertain to the construction of problems rather than to the theories
and methodological approach used to study them. When describing a new approach,
panelists refer to the proposals’ ‘perspective’, ‘angle’, ‘framing’, ‘points of empha-
sis’, ‘questions’, or to their ‘take’ or ‘view’ on things, as well as their ‘approach’.
Thus a scholar in Women’s Studies talks of the ‘importance of looking at [Poe] from
a feminist perspective’; a political scientist remarks on a proposal that has ‘an out-
sider’s perspective and is therefore able to sort of have a unique take on the subject’;
a philosopher describes his work as ‘developing familiar positions in new ways and
with new points of emphasis and detail’; and an historian expresses admiration for
an applicant because ‘she was asking really interesting and sort of new questions,
and she was asking them precisely because she was framing [them] around this prob-
lem of the ethics of [empathy]’. That ‘original approach’ is used much more often
than ‘original theory’ to discuss originality strongly suggests a need to expand our
understanding of how originality is defined, especially when considering research
in the humanities and history, because the original approach is much more central
to evaluation of research in these disciplines than in the social sciences, as we will
soon see.
6 Comparing the Humanities, History and the Social
Sciences
Can we detect disciplinary variations in the categories of originality that reviewers
use when assessing the quality of grant proposals? We address this question only
at the level of generic categories of originality, because the specific types include
too few cases to examine disciplinary variation. For the purpose of our analysis
we compare the generic categories of originality referred to by humanists, social
scientists and historians.
Table 2 shows aggregate differences in the use of generic types of originality across
disciplines and disciplinary clusters. A chi-square test (χ2 = 34.23 on 12 d. f.) indi-
cates significant differences between the disciplines in the way they define originality
at a high level of confidence (p < 0.001). The main finding is that a much larger per-
centage of humanists and historians than social scientists define originality in terms
of the use of an original approach (with respectively 33 %, 43 % and 18 % of the
38 M. Lamont and J. Guetzkow
Table 2 Generic definitions of originality by disciplinary cluster
Originality type Humanities History Social sciences All disciplines
N % N % N % N %
Approach 29 33 26 43 12 18 67 31
Data 19 21 6 10 4 6 29 13
Theory 16 18 11 18 13 19 40 18
Topic 13 15 6 10 13 19 32 15
Method 4 4 5 8 18 27 27 12
Outcome 3 3 4 7 2 3 9 4
Under-studied area 5 6 3 5 5 7 13 6
All generic types 89 100 61 100 67 100 217 100
Note Some rows may not sum to 100 % due to rounding
panelists referring to this category). Humanities scholars are also more likely than
social scientists and historians to define originality in reference to the use of original
‘data’ (which ranges from literary texts to photographs to musical scores). Twenty-
one percent of them refer to this category, as opposed to 10 % of the historians and
6 % of the social scientists. Another important finding is that humanists and histori-
ans are less likely than social scientists to define originality in terms of method (with
4 %, 8 % and 27 % referring to this category, respectively). Moreover humanists, and
to a greater extent, historians, clearly privilege one type of originality—originality
in approach—which they use 33 % and 43 % of the time, respectively. In contrast,
social scientists appear to have a slightly more diversified understanding of what
originality consists of, in that they privilege to approximately the same degree orig-
inality in approach (used by 18 % of the panelists in this category), topic (19 %) and
theory (19 %), with a slight emphasis on method (27 %).
This suggests clearly that the scholars from our three categories privilege differ-
ent dimensions of originality when evaluating proposals: humanists value the use
of an original approach and new data most frequently; historians privilege original
approaches above all other forms of originality; while social scientists emphasize
the use of a new method. But this comparison is couched at a level of abstraction
that allows us to compare these disciplinary clusters according to categories like
‘approach’, ‘data’ and ‘methods’. This risks masking a deeper level of difference
between the meaning of these categories for the social sciences, humanities and his-
tory. For example, when social scientists we interviewed refer to original ‘data’, they
generally mean quantitative datasets; historians usually refer to archival documents
and use the word ‘evidence’; humanities scholars typically refer to written texts,
paintings, photos, film, or music and often use words like ‘text’ and ‘materials’ to
refer to the proposal’s ‘data’.
Likewise, there are sometimes distinct ways in which humanists and social sci-
entists talk about taking a new approach. For example, humanists will often refer
to a canonical text or author that is being approached in a way that is not novel per
se, but is novel because nobody has approached that author or text in that way (e.g.
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a feminist approach to Albert Camus). In contrast, social scientists rarely refer to
novelty with regard to something that is ‘canonical’. Relatively few social scientists
describe originality in terms of approach and those who do so talk overwhelmingly
in terms of ‘new questions’ (accounting for 8 out of 12 social science mentions of
original approach). References to original approaches by historians and humanists
are spread more evenly across the specific subtypes of ‘original approach’. One
third of humanists (8 out of 27) define it in terms of taking a ‘new approach to an
old/canonical topic’, but refer to all the other types with nearly equal frequency. And
although historians mention ‘new questions’ more than any other specific type of
approach (32 % or 9 out of 28), they often mention other specific types as well. And,
although we define ‘methods’ broadly to categorize the way that humanists, social
scientists and historians describe original uses of data, this should not be taken to
mean that ‘method’ means the same thing to all of them. Social scientists sometimes
describe innovative methods as those which would answer ‘unresolved’ questions
and debates (e.g. the question of why the U.S. does not have corporatism), whereas
humanists and historians never mention this as a facet of methodological originality.
Reviewers in the social sciences tend to refer to more methodological detail than
others concerning, say, a research design. For instance, a political scientist says that
an applicant ‘inserted a comparative dimension into [his proposal] in a way that was
pretty ingenious, looking at regional variation across precincts’. In contrast, an his-
torian describes vaguely someone as ‘read[ing] against the grain of the archives’ and
an English scholar enthuses about how one applicant was going to ‘synthesize legal
research and ethnographic study and history of art’, without saying anything more
specific about the details of this methodological mélange.
Arguably, the differences we find are linked to the distinct rhetorics (Bazerman
1981; Fahnestock and Secor 1991; Kaufer and Geisler 1989; MacDonnald 1994) and
epistemological cultures (Knorr-Cetina 1999) of the different disciplines. We do not
wish to make sweeping generalizations about the individual disciplines that compose
each cluster. However, research on the distinct modes of knowledge-making in some
of their constituent disciplines can inform the patterns we find.
In her comparison of English, history and psychology, MacDonnald (1994) shows
that generalizations in English tend to be more text-driven than in the social sciences,
which tend to pursue concept-driven generalizations. History is pulled in both direc-
tions (also see Novick 1988). In text-driven disciplines, the author begins with a
text, which ‘drives the development of interpretive abstractions based on it’. In con-
trast, with conceptually driven generalization, researchers design research ‘in order
to make progress toward answering specific conceptual questions’ (MacDonnald
1994, p. 37). These insights map well onto our findings: original data excites human-
ities scholars because it opens new opportunities for interpretation. Social scientists
value most original methods and research designs, because they hold the promise
of informing new theoretical questions. The humanists’ and historians’ emphasis
on original approaches is an indication that, while they are not as focused on the
production of new generalized explanations (‘original theories’) or on innovative
ways of answering conceptual questions (‘original methods’), they value an ‘origi-
nal approach’ that enables the researcher to study a text or an archive in a way that
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will yield novel interpretations, but which does not necessarily aim at answering
specific conceptual questions.
7 Conclusion
Together, the publications summarized in this paper suggest a research agenda for
developing a better empirical understanding of the specific characteristics of peer
review evaluation in the humanities as compared to other disciplinary clusters. More
needs to do be done in order to fully investigate how the composition of panels and
the disciplines of their members influence the customary rules of evaluation as well
as the meanings associated with the criteria of evaluation and the relative weight put
on them.
The comparative empirical study of evaluative cultures is a topic that remains in
its infancy. Our hope is that this short synthetic paper, along with other publications
which adopt a similar approach, will serve as an invitation to other scholars to pursue
further this line of inquiry. More information is needed before we can draw clear and
definite conclusions about the specific challenges of evaluating scholarship in the
humanities. However, we already know that the role of connoisseurship and the
ability to make fine distinctions is crucial given the centrality of ‘new approaches’
as a criterion for evaluating originality. Whether and how bibliometric methods can
capture the real payoff of this type of original contribution is only one of the many
burning topics that urgently deserve more thorough exploration.
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